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Abstract. Proxy re-encryption is a cryptographic primitive developed
to delegate the decryption right from one party (the delegator) to an-
other (the delegatee). In a proxy re-encryption scheme, the delegator
assigns a key to a proxy to re-encrypt all messages encrypted with his
public key such that the re-encrypted ciphertexts can be decrypted with
the delegatee’s private key. We propose a type-and-identity-based proxy
re-encryption scheme based on the Boneh-Franklin Identity Based En-
cryption (IBE) scheme. In our scheme, the delegator can categorize mes-
sages into different types and delegate the decryption right of each type
to the delegatee through a proxy. Our scheme enables the delegator to
provide the proxy fine-grained re-encryption capability. As an applica-
tion, we propose a fine-grained Personal Health Record (PHR) disclosure
scheme for healthcare service by applying the proposed scheme.
Keywords: Proxy re-encryption, Identity-Based Encryption, Personal Health
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1 Introduction
Proxy re-encryption is a cryptographic method developed to delegate the de-
cryption right from one party (the delegator) to another (the delegatee). In a
proxy re-encryption scheme, the delegator assigns a key to a proxy to re-encrypt
all messages encrypted with his public key such that the re-encrypted ciphertexts
can be decrypted with the delegatee’s private key. Since Mambo and Okamoto
first proposed the concept [1], a number of proxy re-encryption schemes have
been proposed [2,3,4,5,6]. Proxy re-encryption has many promising applications
including access control in file storage [7], email forwarding [8], and law en-
forcement [3]. With the increasing privacy concerns over personal data, proxy
re-encryption, in particular IBE proxy re-encryption schemes (due to their ben-
efits [9]), will find more and more applications. For example, in the healthcare
domain, many regulations, such as HIPPA [10], require that the patient is the
owner of his personal health record and should control the disclosure policy for
his Personal Health Record (PHR). As we show in Section 5, proxy re-encryption
is a powerful tool for patient to enforce his PHR disclosure policies.
1.1 Motivations and contributions
An observation on the existing proxy re-encryption schemes is that the proxy
is able to re-encrypt all ciphertexts from the delegator to the delegatee. As
a result, it is difficult for the delegator to implement any further fine-grained
cryptographically enforced access control policy for multiple delegation services.
Suppose the delegator wants delegatees Bob and Charlie to recover different
subsets of his messages. In this case, the delegator can only trust the proxy to
enforce his policies by re-encrypting the legitimate ciphertexts. In practice, this
trust assumption might be unrealistic (for example, the proxy can be corrupted).
To solve this problem, an alternative solution would be that the delegator chooses
a different key pair for each delegatee, which is also unrealistic.
Contribution We propose a type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme
based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme to enable the delegator to implement
different access control policies for his ciphertexts against his delegatees. To
achieve our goal, in the proposed scheme, the delegator can categorize his mes-
sages into different types, and delegate the decryption right of each type to the
delegatee through a proxy. One benefit of our scheme is that the delegator only
needs one key pair to provide fine-grained re-encryption capability to his proxy.
In other words, the delegator only needs one key pair to provide fine-grained ac-
cess control policies for his ciphertexts against his delegatees. The other benefit
is that there is no further trust assumption on the proxy compared to exist-
ing proxy re-encryption schemes. However, the proposed scheme works only for
the ciphertexts generated by the delegator. As an application, we propose a fine-
grained PHR disclosure scheme for a healthcare service by applying the proposed
scheme.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce related
work in proxy re-encryption. In Section 3 we briefly review the preliminaries
of pairing and IBE. In Section 4 we present our new scheme which enables the
delegator to offer fine-grained re-encryption capability to the proxy and prove
its security. In Section 5 we propose a fine-grained PHR disclosure scheme as an
application of our proxy re-encryption scheme. The last section concludes the
paper.
2 Related work
Mambo and Okamoto [1] first propose the concept of delegation of decryption
right in the context of speeding up decryption operations. Blaze et al. [2] intro-
duce the concept of atomic proxy cryptography which is the current concept of
proxy re-encryption. In a proxy re-encryption scheme, the proxy can transform
ciphertexts encrypted with the delegator’s public key into ciphertexts that can
be decrypted with the delegatee’s private key. Blaze et al. propose a proxy re-
encryption scheme based on the ElGamal encryption scheme [11]. One property
of this scheme is that, with the same proxy key, the proxy can transform the ci-
phertexts not only form the delegator to the delegatee but also from the delegatee
to the delegator. This is called the “bi-directional” property in the literature.
Bi-directionality might be a problem in some applications, but it might also
be a desirable property in some other applications. Jacobsson [4] addresses this
“problem” using a quorum controlled asymmetric proxy re-encryption where the
proxy is implemented with multiple servers and each of them performs partial
re-encryption.
Dodis and Ivan [3] propose a generic construction method for proxy re-
encryption schemes and also provide a number of example schemes. Their con-
structions are based on the concept of secret splitting, which means that the
delegator splits his private key into two parts and sends them to the proxy and
the delegatee separately. During the re-encryption process the proxy performs
partial decryption of the encrypted message using the first part of the delegator’s
private key, and the delegatee can recover the message by performing partial de-
cryption using the second part of the delegator’s private key. One disadvantage
of this method is that it is not collusion-safe, i.e. the proxy and the delegatee
together can recover the delegator’s private key. Another disadvantage of this
scheme is that the delegatee’s public/private key pair can only be used for deal-
ing with the delegator’s messages. If this key pair is used by the delegatee for
other encryption services, then the delegator can always decrypt the ciphertexts.
Ateniese et al. [7] propose several proxy re-encryption schemes based on the
ElGamal scheme. In their schemes, the delegator does not have to interact and
share his private key with the delegatee. The delegator stores two secret keys, a
master secret key and a “weak” secret key. The ciphertext can be fully decrypted
using either of the two distinct keys. Their scheme is collusion safe, since only
the “weak” secret key is exposed if the delegatee and the proxy collude but the
master key remains safe. The disadvantage of this scheme is that the delegator
has to perform two levels of encryptions, the first level encryption encrypts
messages that can be decrypted by the delegator, and the second level encryption
encrypts messages that can be decrypted by the delegator and his delegatees.
In addition, Ateniese et al. also discuss a number of properties for proxy re-
encryption schemes in [7].
The concept of IBE is proposed by Shamir [12]. Unlike a traditional public
key encryption scheme, an IBE does not require a digital certificate to certify the
public key because the public key of any user in an IBE can be an arbitrary string
such as an email address, IP address, etc. IBE becomes practical and popular
after Boneh and Fraklin [9] propose the first pairing-based scheme. Recently,
two IBE proxy re-encryption schemes were proposed by Matsuo [6] and Green
and Atteniese [5], respectively. The Matsuo scheme assumes that the delegator
and the delegatee belong to the same Key Generation Center (KGC) and use the
Boneh-Boyen encryption scheme [13]. The Green-Atteniese scheme assumes that
the delegator and the delegatee can belong to different KGCs but the delegatee
posesses the public parameter of the delegator’s KGC.
3 Preliminary
In this section we briefly review the pairing technique and the concept of IBE.
3.1 Review of pairing
We briefly review the basis of pairing and the related assumptions. More detailed
information can be found in the seminal paper [9]. A pairing (or, bilinear map)
satisfies the following properties:
1. G and G1 are two multiplicative groups of prime order p;
2. g is a generator of G;
3. eˆ : G×G→ G1 is an efficiently-computable bilinear map with the following
properties:
– Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have eˆ(ua, vb) = eˆ(u, v)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
As defined in [9], G is said to be a bilinear group if the group action in G
can be computed efficiently and if there exists a group G1 and an efficiently-
computable bilinear map eˆ as defined above.
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem inG is as follows: given g, ga, gb, gc ∈
G as input, output eˆ(g, g)abc ∈ G1. An algorithm A has advantage ² in solving
BDH in G if:
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc) = eˆ(g, g)abc] ≥ ².
Similarly, we say that an algorithm A has advantage ² in solving the decision
BDH problem in G if:
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, gabc) = 0]− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T ) = 0]| ≥ ².
Here the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, the random choice
of T ∈ G1, and the random bits of A (the adversary is a nondeterministic
algorithm).
Definition 1. We say that the (decision) (t, ²)-BDH assumption holds in G
if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ² in solving the (decision) BDH
problem in G.
As in the general group, the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem
in G is as follows: given g, ga, gb ∈ G as input, output gab ∈ G. An algorithm A
has advantage ² in solving CDH in G if:
Pr[A(g, ga, gb) = gab] ≥ ².
Definition 2. We say that the (t, ²)-CDH assumption holds in G if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least ² in solving the CDH problem in G.
Given a security parameter k, a problem (say, BDH) is believed to be in-
tractable if any adversary has only negligible advantage in reasonable time. We
usually define a scheme to be secure if any adversary has only a negligible ad-
vantage in the underlying security model. The time parameter is usually be
ignored.
Definition 3. The function P (k) : Z → R is said to be negligible if, for every
polynomial f(k), there exists an integer Nf such that P (k) ≤ 1f(k) for all k ≥ Nf .
3.2 Review of Identity Based Encryption
We briefly review the Boneh-Fraklin scheme, which, compared with the original
scheme [9], is slightly modified in the definition of the message domain and the
encryption/decryption procedures (as we show below). Nonetheless, we still call
it the Boneh-Franklin scheme.
1. Setup(k) : Run by the KGC, given a security parameter k, the algorithm
generates two cyclic groups G and G1 of prime order p, a generator g of G, a
bilinear map eˆ : G×G→ G1, a master secret key α ∈ Z∗p, and a hash function
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G. The public parameter is params = (G,G1, p, g,H1, eˆ, pk),
where pk = gα is the public key of the KGC.
In the original Boneh-Franklin scheme, the plaintext space is {0, 1}n where
n is an integer and there is an additional hash function H2 : G1 → {0, 1}n.
2. Extract(id) : Run by the KGC, given an identifier id, the algorithm outputs
the private key skid = pkαid, where pkid = H1(id).
3. Encrypt(m, id) : Run by the message sender, given a message m ∈ G1 and
an identifier id ∈ {0, 1}∗ the algorithm outputs the ciphertext c = (c1, c2)
where c1 = gr, c2 = m · eˆ(pkid, pk)r, and r ∈ Z∗p.
In the original Boneh-Franklin scheme, c2 = m⊕ H2(eˆ(pkid, pk)r).
4. Decrypt(c, skid) : Run by the receiver with identifier id, given a ciphertext
c = (c1, c2) and skid, the algorithm outputs the message m = c2eˆ(skid,c1) .
In the original Boneh-Franklin scheme, m = c2 ⊕ H2(eˆ(skid, c1)).
The same modifications are also made in in [5] and they are essential for us
to construct proxy re-encryption schemes. Implied by the security proof of the
scheme IBP1 in [5], the Boneh-Franklin scheme is semantically secure against
an adaptive chosen plaintext attack (IND-ID-CPA) based on the decision BDH
assumption in the random oracle model. The IND-ID-CPA security is defined as
follows.
The semantic security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-
CCA) is modelled by an IND-ID-CPA game. The game is carried out between
a challenger and an adversary, where the challenger simulates the protocol exe-
cution and answers the queries from the adversary. Specifically, the game is as
follows.
1. Game setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup
algorithm to generate the public system parameter params and the master
key mk.
2. Phase 1: The adversary takes params as input and is allowed to issue two
type of queries:
(a) Extract query with any identifier id: The challenger returns the private
key skid corresponding to id.
(b) Decrypt query with any ciphertext c and any identifier id: The challenger
runs Extract to generate the private key skid corresponding to id, and
then returns the value of Decrypt(c, skid).
Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length
plaintexts m0,m1 and an identifier id∗ on which it wishes to be challenged.
The only constraint is that id∗ has not been the input to any Extract query.
3. Challenge: The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns c∗ =
Encrypt(mb, id∗) as the challenge to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to continue issuing the same types of
queries as in Phase 1. However, it is not allowed to ask a Extract query with
the input id∗ and a Decrypt query with the input (c∗, id∗).
5. Guess (game ending): the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 4. An IBE scheme is said to be semantically secure against an adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) if no polynomial-time adversary
has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the IND-ID-CCA game,
where the adversary’s advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Definition 5. An IBE scheme is said to be semantically secure against an adap-
tive chosen plaintext attack (IND-ID-CPA) if any polynomial time IND-ID-CCA
adversary’s advantage is negligible when it makes no Decrypt query in the game.
Apart from semantic security, we can also define the one-wayness for IBE.
Formally, we have the following attack game.
1. Game setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup
algorithm to generate the public system parameter params and the master
key mk.
2. Extraction: The adversary takes params as input and is allowed to issue any
number of Extract query with any identifier id: The challenger returns the
private key skid corresponding to id. Once the adversary decides that this
phase is over, it outputs an identifier id∗ on which it wishes to be challenged.
The only constraint is that id∗ has not been the input to any Extract query.
3. Challenge: The challenger picks a random message m and returns c∗ =
Encrypt(m, id∗) as the challenge to the adversary.
4. Guess (game ending): the adversary outputs a guess m′.
Definition 6. An IBE scheme is said to be one-way if any polynomial time
adversary’s advantage is negligible in the above game, where the adversary’s
advantage is defined to be Pr[m′ = m].
4 A type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme
In this section we propose a type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme
based on the Boneh-Franklin scheme described in Section 3.2. In our scheme,
the delegator and the delegatee are allowed to be from different domains, which
nonetheless share some public parameters.
– Suppose that the delegator is registered at KGC1 in a modified Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme (Setup1,Extract1,Encrypt1,Decrypt1). Users categorize
their messages into different types, say {t ∈ {0, 1}∗}; the IBE algorithms are
defined as follows.
• Setup1 and Extract1 are the same as in the Boneh-Franklin scheme, ex-
cept that Setup1 outputs an additional hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p.
The public parameter is params1 = (G,G1, p, g,H1,H2, eˆ, pk1), and the
master key is mk1 = α1.
• Encrypt1(m, t, id) : Given a message m, a type t, and an identifier id, the
algorithm outputs the ciphertext c = (c1, c2, c3) where r ∈R Z∗p,
c1 = gr, c2 = m · eˆ(pkid, pk)r·H2(skid||t), c3 = t.





Without loss of generality, suppose the delegator holds the identity idi and
the corresponding private key skidi . Apart from the delegator, another party
cannot run the Encrypt1 algorithm under the delegator’s identity idi since
he does not know skidi .
– Suppose that the delegatee (with identity idj) possesses private key skidj
registered at KGC2 in the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme, where the public
parameter is params2 = (G,G1, p, g,H1, eˆ, pk2), the master key is mk2 =
α2, and skidj = H1(idj)
α2 . For the ease of comparison, we denote the IBE
scheme as (Setup2,Extract2,Encrypt2,Decrypt2) although these algorithms
are identical to those described in Section 3.2.
4.1 The delegation process
If the delegator wants to delegate his decryption right for messages with type t
to the delegatee, the algorithms of the proxy re-encryption scheme are as follows.
– Pextract(idi, idj , t, skidi): Run by the delegator, this algorithm takes the del-
egator’s identifier idi, the delegatee’s identifier idj , the type t, and the dele-
gator’s private key skidi as input and outputs the proxy key rkidi→idj , where
X ∈R G1 and




– Preenc(ci, rkidi→idj ): Run by the proxy, this algorithm, takes a ciphertext
ci = (ci1, ci2, ci3) and the proxy key rkidi→idj as input where t = ci3, and
outputs a new ciphertext cj = (cj1, cj2, cj3), where cj1 = ci1 and
cj2 = ci2 · eˆ(ci1, sk−H2(skidi ||ci3)idi · H1(X))




= m · eˆ(gr,H1(X)),
and cj3 = Encrypt2(X, idj).










We assume that both KGC1 and KGC2 are semi-trusted in the following sense:
they will behave honestly all the time except that they might be curious about
the plaintexts for either the delegator or the delegatee; in addition, they are
passive attackers. As mentioned in [14], the key escrow problem of IBE can be
avoided by applying some standard techniques (such as secret sharing) to the un-
derlying scheme, hence, we skip any further discussion in this paper. The proxy
is assumed to be semi-trusted in the following sense: it will honestly convert the
delegator’s ciphertexts using the proxy key; however, it might act actively to
obtain some information about the plaintexts for the delegator and the delega-
tee. The delegatee may be curious in the sense that it may try to obtain some
information about the plaintexts corresponding to the delegator’s ciphertexts
which have not been re-encrypted by the proxy.
As a standard practice, we describe an attack game for modeling the semantic
security against an adaptive chosen plaintext attack for the delegator (IND-
ID-DR-CPA security) for our scheme. The IND-ID-DR-CPA game is carried
out between a challenger and an adversary, where the challenger simulates the
protocol execution and answers the queries from the adversary. Note that the
allowed queries for the adversary reflect the adversary’s capability in practice.
Specifically, the game is as follows.
1. Game setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k as input, runs the
Setup1 algorithm to generate the public system parameter params1 and the
master keymk1, and runs the Setup2 algorithm to generate the public system
parameter params2 and the master key mk2.
2. Phase 1: The adversary takes params1 and params2 as input and is allowed
to issue the following types of queries:
(a) Extract1 query with any identifier id: The challenger returns the private
key sk corresponding to id.
(b) Extract2 query with any identifier id′: The challenger returns the private
key sk′ corresponding to id′.
(c) Pextract query with (id, id′, t): The challenger returns the proxy key
rkid→id′ for the type t.
(d) Preenc† query with (m, t, id, id′): The challenger first computes c =
Encrypt1(m, t, id) and then returns a new ciphertext c′ which is obtained
by applying the delegation key rkid→id′ to c, where rkid→id′ is issued for
type t.
Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length
plaintexts m0,m1, a type t∗, and an identifier id∗. At the end of Phase 1,
there are three constraints here:
(a) id∗ has not been the input to any Extract1 query.
(b) For any id′, if (id∗, id′, t∗) has been the input to a Pextract query then
id′ has not been the input to any Extract2 query.
(c) If there is a Preenc† query with (m, t, id, id′), then (id, id′, t) has not been
queried to Pextract.
3. Challenge: The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns c∗ =
Encrypt1(mb, t∗, id∗) as the challenge to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: The adversary is allowed to continue issuing the same types of
queries as in Phase 1. At the end of Phase 2, there are the same constraints
At the end of Phase 1.
5. Guess (game ending): the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
At the end of the game, the adversary’s advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ =
b] − 12 |. Compared with the CPA security formalizations in [5,6], in our case,
we also take into account the categorization of messages for the delegator. The
Preenc† query reflects the fact that a curious delegatee has access to the the
delegator’s plaintexts.
4.3 Security analysis of our scheme
We first briefly prove the IND-ID-DR-CPA security of our scheme and then show
some other security properties.
Theorem 1. For the type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme de-
scribed in Section 4.1, any adversary’s advantage is negligible.
Proof sketch. We suppose that the total number of queries issued to H1 and H2
is bounded by integer q1 and q2, respectively3. Suppose an adversary A has the
3 For simplicity of description, it is reasonable to assume that the total number is
counted for queries with different inputs.
non-negligible advantage ² in the IND-ID-DR-CPA game. The security proof is
done through a sequence of games.
Game0: In this game, B faithfully answers the oracle queries from A. Specifi-
cally, B simulates the random oracle H1 as follows: B maintains a list of vectors,
each of them containing a request message, an element of G (the hash-code for
this message), and an element of Z∗p. After receiving a request message, B first
checks its list to see whether the request message is already in the list. If the
check succeeds, B returns the stored element of G; otherwise, B returns gy, where
y a randomly chosen element of Z∗p, and stores the new vector in the list. A′ sim-
ulates the random oracle H2 as follows: B maintains a list of vectors, each of
them containing a request message and an element of Z∗p (the hash-code for this
message). After receiving a request message, B first checks its list to see whether
the request message is already in the list. If the check succeeds, B returns the
stored element of Z∗p; otherwise, B returns u which is a randomly chosen element
of Z∗p, and stores the new vector in the list.
Let δ0 = Pr[b′ = b], as we assumed at the beginning, |δ0 − 12 | = ².
Game1: In this game, B answers the oracle queries from A as follows.
1. Game setup: B faithfully simulates the setup phase.
2. Phase 1: B randomly selects j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q1+1}. If j = q1+1, B faithfully
answers the oracle queries from A. If 1 ≤ j ≤ q1, we assume the j-th input
to H1 is i˜d and B answers the oracle queries from A as follows: Answer the
queries to Extract1, Extract2, Pextract, and Preenc† faithfully, except that B
aborts as a failure when i˜d is the input to a Extract1 query.
3. Challenge: After receiving (m0,m1, t∗, id∗) from the adversary, if one of the
following events occurs, B aborts as a failure.
(a) id∗ has been issued to H1 as the i-th query and i 6= j,
(b) id∗ has not been issued to H1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ q1.
Note that, if the adversary does not abort then either 1 ≤ j ≤ q1 and id∗ = i˜d
is the input to j-th H1 query or j = q1 + 1 and id∗ has not been the input
to any H1 query. B faithfully returns the challenge.
4. Phase 2: B answers the oracle queries faithfully.
5. Guess (game ending): the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The probability that B successfully ends is 1q1+1 , i.e. the probability that B
does not abort in its execution is 1q1+1 . Let δ1 = Pr[b
′ = b] when B successfully
ends, in which case |δ1 = δ0|. Let θ1 be the probability that B successfully ends
and b′ = b. We have θ1 = δ1q1+1 .
Game2: In this game, B simulates the protocol execution and answers the
oracle queries from A in the following way.
1. Game setup: B faithfully simulates the setup phase. Recall that pk1 = gα1 .
2. Phase 1: B randomly selects j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q1+1}. If j = q1+1, B faithfully
answers the oracle queries from A. If 1 ≤ j ≤ q1, B answers j-th query to H1
with gβ where β ∈R Z∗p, and answers the oracle queries from A as follows.
Suppose the input of the j-th query to H1 is i˜d.
(a) Answer Extract1 and Extract2 faithfully, except that B aborts as a failure
when i˜d is the input to a Extract1 query.
(b) Pextract query with (id, id′, t): If id = i˜d, B returns the proxy key
rkid→id′ , where
gt∼id′ ∈R G, Xt∼id′ ∈R G1, rkid→id′ = (t, gt∼id′ ,Encrypt2(Xt∼id′ , id′)).
Otherwise, B answers the query faithfully. If id′ has been queried to
Extract2, when Xt∼id′ is queried to H1 then B returns gt∼id′ · h−1t∼id′
where ht∼id′ ∈R G.
(c) Preenc† query with (m, t, id, id′): If id = i˜d, B returns
r ∈R Z∗p, Xt∼id′ ∈R G1, c′ = (gr, eˆ(gr,H1(Xt∼id′)),Encrypt2(Xt∼id′ , id′)).
Otherwise, B answers the query faithfully.
3. Challenge: After receiving (m0,m1, t∗, id∗) from the adversary, if one of the
following events occurs, B aborts as a failure.
(a) id∗ has been issued to H1 as the i-th query and i 6= j,
(b) id∗ has not been issued to H1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ q1.
Note that, if the adversary does not abort then either 1 ≤ j ≤ q1 and id∗ = i˜d
is the input to j-th H1 query or j = q1 + 1 and id∗ has not been the input
to any H1 query. In the latter case, B sets H1(id∗) = gβ where β ∈R Z∗p, and




3) as the challenge to the adversary, where:
b ∈R {0, 1}, r ∈R Z∗p, T ∈R G1, c∗1 = gr, c∗2 = mb · T, c∗3 = t∗.
4. Phase 2: B answers the oracle queries from A as in Phase 1.
5. Guess (game ending): the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Let θ2 be the probability that B successfully ends and b′ = b. We have
θ2 = 12(q1+1) since T ∈R G1. Let E1 be the event that, for some id′ and t, the
adversary issues a H2 query with the input gα1·β ||t or Xt∼id′ is issued to H1
while id′ has not been issued to Extract2. Compared with Game1, Game2 differs
when E1 occurs. From the difference lemma [15], we have |δ2− δ1| ≤ ²2 which is
negligible in the random oracle model based on the BDH assumption. Note that
(Setup2,Extract2,Encrypt2,Decrypt2) is one-way based on the BDH assumption
and BDH implies CDH.
From |θ2−θ1| ≤ ²2 and θ2 = 12(q1+1) , we have | 12(q1+1) −θ1| ≤ ²2. In addition,
from |δ0 − 12 | = ², |δ1 − δ0| ≤ ²1 and θ1 = δ1q1+1 , we have ²q1+1 ≤ ²1q1+1 + ²2.
Because ²i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2) are negligible and ² is assumed to be non-negligible,
we get a contradiction. As a result, the proposed scheme is IND-ID-DR-CPA
secure based on the CDH assumption in the random oracle model, given that
(Setup2,Extract2,Encrypt2,Decrypt2) is one-way. uunionsq
Recall that Ateniese et al. describe a number of properties for proxy re-
encryption schemes [7]. Our scheme possesses the following properties:
– Uni-directional. In our scheme, the delegation key is generated by the dele-
gator, hence it is clear that the delegation is only from the delegator to the
delegatee but not from the delegatee to the delegator.
– Non-Interactive. In our scheme, the delegator creates the re-encryption key
by himself, neither the delegatee nor any other party is involved.
– Collusion Safe. In our scheme, the delegatee and the proxy together can
recover the private key for the type t if the delegator wants to delegate
his decryption right for t to the delegatee. We cannot see any damage here
since the delegatee is allowed to see the messages encrypted under this key.
Apart from this, the delegatee and the proxy together cannot recover the
delegator’s private key skidi ; in particular, they cannot recover any key for
other message types from Theorem 1.
5 Fine-grained PHR disclosure
As mentioned in [16], a Personal Health Record (PHR) contains all kinds of
health-related information about an individual (say, Alice). Firstly, the PHR
contains medical data from various medical service providers, for example about
surgery, illness, family history, vaccinations, laboratory test results, allergies,
drug reactions, etc. Secondly, the PHR may also contain information collected
by Alice herself, for example weight change, food statistics, and any other in-
formation connected with her health. The PHR is helpful for Alice to obtain
health care services and monitor her health status, however, a PHR is sensitive
information. Inappropriate disclosure of the PHR may cause an individual seri-
ous problems. For example, if Alice has some disease and a prospective employer
obtains this, then she might be discriminated in finding a job. Alice needs to
protect her PHR. It is worth stressing that PHR data may have different levels
of privacy concerns. For example, Alice may not be seriously concerned about
disclosing her food statistics to other persons, but she might wish to keep her
illness history as a top secret and only disclose it to the appropriate person.
There are some possible solutions to guarantee the privacy of Alice’s PHR.
In one solution, Alice could make her own access control policies for her PHR,
store her PHR in plaintext in a database, and rely on this database to enforce her
policies. In this case, Alice needs to trust the database fully. Once the database
is corrupted all Alice’s PHR will be disclosed. As an alternative, Alice could
encrypt her PHR and store the ciphertext in a database, and then decrypt the
ciphertext on demand. In this case, Alice only needs to assume that the database
will properly store her encrypt data, and even if the database is corrupted Alice’s
PHR will not be disclosed. The problem with this solution is that Alice needs to
be involved in every request and perform the decryption. Yet another solution
is to use a traditional proxy re-encryption scheme, in which Alice assigns a
re-encryption key to the database which re-encrypts the encrypted PHR into
encrypted PHR with the requester’s public key. In this case, Alice must assume
that the database will properly store her encrypt data and that the database
performs the re-encryption. If the database is corrupted, some of Alice’s PHR
may be disclosed to an illegitimate entity based on the fact that the proxy key
can re-encrypt all Alice’s encrypted PHR. To avoid this problem, Alice needs to
have as many key pairs as there are categories of her PHR data.
Using our type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme, we can con-
struct a fine-grained PHR disclosure scheme for Alice as follows:
1. Alice categorizes her PHR according to her privacy concerns. For instance,
she can set her illness history as type t1, her food statistics as type t2, and
the necessary PHR data in case of emergency as type t3.
2. For each type of PHR, Alice finds a proxy and stores each type of her PHR
in encrypted form using our scheme, and assigns a re-encryption key to the
proxy. In practice, this could be a dynamic process. For example, if Alice
wishes to travel to the US, then she can find a proxy there and store her
encrypted PHR data for emergency case (type t3) there. Then if Alice needs
emergency help in the US, the PHR data can be disclosed on demand by the
proxy.
In this solution Alice only needs one key pair to protect her PHR data and
can choose the proxy for each category of her PHR data according to her trust
and privacy concerns. Since Alice chooses a different proxy for every type of
PHR, even if the proxies for certain types of PHR are corrupted, other types of
PHR cannot be illegitimately disclosed from Theorem 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a type-and-identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme
based on the Boneh-Franklin scheme which has been proved semantically se-
cure against a chosen plaintext attack. Our scheme enables the delegator to
provide different re-encryption capabilities to the proxy while using the same
key pair. This property is showed to be useful in our PHR disclosure scheme,
where an individual can easily implement fine-grained access control policies to
his PHR data. For future work, it would be interesting to construct type-and-
identity-based proxy re-encryption schemes with chosen ciphertext security and
to investigate new applications for this primitive.
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